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One Moment, Please: Can the Speed and Quality of Political Contact Affect 
Democratic Health. 
Dr Nikki Soo (University of Cardiff); Dr James Weinberg (University of Sheffield); Dr 
Kate Dommett (University of Sheffield). 
 . 
 
Abstract: 
Contact between politicians and their constituents is the cornerstone of democracies globally but 
an area of scholarship that remains relatively under-developed. Political contact can help convey 
authority, provide legitimacy and facilitate governance. This article goes beyond the assumption 
that representatives need to communicate more with the public and suggest, instead, that the 
quality of contact matters. Focusing on four processes which citizens can contact their 
representatives (face-to-face, by letter, email or social media), we employ an experimental 
vignette methodology (EVM) to test whether the character and timeliness of politicians 
responses to citizen communication affects two indicators of democratic health: (a) the latters 
satisfaction with political contact and (b) their likelihood to re-contact representatives. Our 
findings provide evidence that personalised communication and to a smaller extent, speed of 
response, can influence citizen satisfaction and likelihood of reengagement, suggesting politicians 
can improve these indicators of democratic health by adjusting their communication content.  
Keywords: Political Contact  Representation  Politicians  Engagement  Communication  
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Introduction 
Political contact is an inherent feature of many democratic systems around the globe and 
describes the interaction between representatives and citizens. An enduring feature of democracy, 
political contact helps to convey authority, provide legitimacy and facilitate governance. Evident 
in a variety of different forms, from casual encounters on the street to formal consultation 
processes, representatives and those they represent can interact in different ways and mediums. 
And yet, whilst an essential feature of many representative systems, we currently know little 
about the conditions in which such contact is viewed favourably (or not), and whether the 
content and media of said contact actually matters. In the context of growing evidence of 
political discontent and negative public views about representatives and representative processes 
(Grayling, 2017; Hay, 2007; Norris, 2011; Runciman, 2018; Seyd, 2015), this is a significant gap in 
our understanding of democratic representation. At the same time, this is one aspect of politics 
where representatives have a degree of control. They can, to some extent, orchestrate the way 
political contact is conducted, suggesting that information on what citizens think about conduct 
could be of value to politicians.  
In this article, we go beyond the assumption that representatives need to communicate 
more with the public to consider the significance of the quality of contact between governors and 
governed. We undertake a micro-level analysis of political representation by exploring the 
significance of variations in the style and format of political contact for two measures of 
democratic health: citizens satisfaction with political contact and their likelihood of reengaging 
with a representative about substantive policy issues. On one hand, this matters for our collective 
understanding of when, why and how specific interpersonal elements of politics might 
ameliorate the mutual withdrawal of state and citizens from one another. On the other hand, we 
believe this study has direct practical applicability for politicians, who are the subject of public 
criticisms and seek potential remedies in a job where control is fleeting but the stresses and 
strains are many. By studying the micro-dynamics of everyday political contact, we unite supply- 
and demand-side explanations of representation to address these aims.    
Looking in detail at four processes by which citizens can contact their representatives 
(face-to-face, by letter, email or social media), we use an experimental vignette methodology 
(EVM) to test whether the character and timeliness of politicians responses affected citizens 
views. Using a diverse sample of 1500 members of the UK public, we find that politicians can 
alter and adjust their political communications to a) improve public satisfaction and b) increase 
the likelihood of future contact between politicians and the public. These results hold even after 
controlling for contextual and socio-demographic variables. We also find that personalised and 
interactive styles of political communication may mitigate the negative impact of pre-existing 
anti-political sentiment on participants satisfaction with politicians. These findings mark an 
important contribution to our understanding of political conduct and representation, but also 
provide specific recommendations to politicians on how to improve constituent communication 
and satisfaction. 
I. Political Contact in Existing Research  
The idea of democratic representation is ancient and complex (Pitkin, 1967). As 
Mansbridge noted there is more than one way to be represented legitimately in a democracy 
(2003, p.515), a truism that has fostered wide-ranging debate about the relationships between 
citizens and those who seek to represent. Operating as a principal-agent relationship 
(Castiglione and Warren, 2006: 1), it is widely recognised that representatives face formidable 
challenges in attempting to channel the wishes of a diverse and often capricious public into 
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politics (Kölln, 2015: 610; Urbinati and Warren, 2008: 389). In addressing this dilemma, many 
scholars have explored the importance of interactions between representatives and the 
represented. Dobson (2014: 3), for example, has stressed the importance of listening, arguing 
that the mechanics of responsiveness become extremely important [because] for there to be 
any chance of [my will being represented by my representative]my representative needs to 
know what my will is. This implies listening, in its broadest sense. In turn, this entails forms of 
political contact whereby interaction can occur. 
In seeking to understand representation, Hofstetter and Stokoe (2015) argue that not 
enough attention has been given to the form and processes of interaction between constituents 
and representatives. Whilst a small literature does attempt to do this, attention has focused on 
identifying different representative dynamics. Fennos (1977) Home Style, for example, offers a 
detailed ethnographic insight into the myriad ways that US Congressman engaged with their 
districts, identifying different representative styles and procedures. Other scholars have 
categorised representatives use of specific communication tools, tracing the use of 
representatives websites (Gibson et al., 2003; Lilleker et al., 2011), blogs (Davis, 2009), emails 
(Jackson, 2004; Vaccari, 2014) and social media (Jackson and Lilleker, 2011; Joshi and Rosenfield, 
2013; Tromble, 2016). A different strand of work has also analysed the degree to which 
representatives behaviour accords with constituents demands (Linde and Peters, 2018). 
Common to much of this analysis is a focus on citizens representative preferences (Bengtsson 
and Wass, 2010; Carman, 2006; Vivyan and Wagner, 2015), and yet little work to date has looked 
at political contact, and specifically its potential to induce positive democratic outcomes.  
This lacuna is surprising given the amount of attention that has been devoted to 
evidencing a crisis in citizens faith in democracy generally and politicians in particular. With 
successive surveys showing evidence of negative views of politics, many academics have sought 
to offer meso- and macro-level explanations for this trend (Boswell and Corbett, 2015; Clarke et 
al., 2017), but relatively little research has taken a solutions-focused approach to democratic 
malaise (cf. Flinders, 2012). Furthermore, little to no empirical research has been conducted on 
the potential for positive experiences of political contact to affect public views of politicians and 
political institutions. Where analyses of political contact have occurred, they focus on the 
variables that explain which citizens interact with their representatives and why, highlighting the 
significance of citizens gender, education and social capital (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; 
Verba and Nie, 1972). Alternatively, they have offered insights about the presence or absence (as 
opposed to the form) of political conduct, finding that interactivity between citizens and 
politicians in any format catalyses a range of positive effects such as increases in citizens political 
efficacy (Tedesco, 2007), increasingly favourable candidate evaluations (Sundar et al., 2003), 
greater identification with politicians (Lander, 2007), and even possibly electoral turnout 
(Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2001). 
Noting these trends, we build on these literatures to explore the significance of 
politicians strategic approaches to political contact for two measures that we believe to be 
indicative of positive democratic health. Specifically we explore the extent to which variations in 
political contact affect citizens reported satisfaction with the experience of contact itself, and the 
likelihood that they will contact their politician again about substantive policy concerns. This 
allows us to explore whether changes in the style and form of representatives responses to 
citizen communications can have positive attitudinal and action-based effects. Given recent 
evidence about representatives increasing interest in testing and responding to similar data  
with many political actors using A/B message testing to refine communication and achieve 
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desirable results (Kreiss, 2016)  we argue that there is an incentive to explore if and how the 
dynamics of political contact can affect political participation. 
IIa. Political Contact in the UK 
In this article we focus on one particular context, the United Kingdom (UK). The UK 
presents an ideal case study because, as the locus of the Westminster Parliamentary system, its 
procedures and practices have been replicated widely around the world. Whilst representation 
can occur at local, regional, national and international levels, our analysis focuses on national 
constituency representation. The British system is renowned for developing close links between 
representatives and their constituents (Dobson, 2014: 171) as individual representatives are 
elected to speak for specific geographical areas termed constituencies. With an average of 
72,000 individuals within each constituency in England, the potential demand for contact is also 
extensive.  
Since 1969, Members of Parliament (MPs) have been granted funds to travel to and from 
their constituency, and to maintain a staff that help the MP manage constituent correspondence 
and administration, as well as an office (that can be situated in their constituency and/or London) 
(Flynn, 1997; Crewe, 2015). They are also able to draw parliamentary allowances to fund 
communications with their constituents such as postage, telephone calls, newsletter printing and 
website development (Gay, 2005, 64). These dynamics mean that MPs can be contacted in many 
different ways (Cain et al., 1987; Gay, 2005; King, 1974; McAllister, 2015; Wood and Norton, 
1992). Every British representative is required to provide a physical address in addition to a 
phone number and an email address, so that they are available to anyone and everyone within 
their constituency. For example, 90% of MPs hold constituency surgeries (Gay, 2005: 58) 
whereby they return to their constituencies to meet voters face-to-face (Dobson, 2014: 170). 
Most if not all MPs also have public websites, social media profiles, and are available to contact 
at local and national events. Political contact is therefore an established feature of the UK system, 
making it an ideal case in which to study its impact on measures of democratic health.  
In addition, the UK offers an interesting case because of evidence of a growing demand 
for contact with MPs. Recent analyses have shown that MPs are experiencing increasing levels of 
communication (Gandy, 2018; Norton and Wood, 1993: 42). Between the 1920s and 1960s, MPs 
were found to reply to around 50 constituent letters a week, with the number of letters received 
increasing tenfold between 1950 and 1980 (Norton and Wood, 1993; Radice et al., 1987; Norris, 
1997; Gay, 2005). This has increased even more radically since. A newly elected MP in 2010 
found that in his/her first 10 months in the job they received over 39,400 pieces of 
communication, of which 24,000 were e-mails, 9,600 letters, and 4,800 telephone calls (Hansard 
Society, 2015). This suggests that MPs are facing increasing demand and are potentially 
incentivised to engage in more cursory forms of political contact. This case therefore provides an 
interesting context in which to explore whether the quality of political contact matters for 
democracy. 
IIb. Hypotheses 
In setting out to study political contact, we are interested in exploring how the quality of 
contact between governor and governed can affect two behavioural and attitudinal indicators of 
democratic health: 
a) Citizens satisfaction with their experience of political contact; 
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b) The likelihood that they will pursue future contact with a representative. 
These dependent variables were chosen to assess the extent to which MPs might alter political 
contact to (a) improve satisfaction, (b) encourage increased communication with their electorate, 
and (c) act as a fillip to broader political participation among the public. As such, we argue that 
in subsequent combination, these two indicators contribute to better democratic health. On one 
hand, we use outcome (a) to capture public attitudes towards the representative process itself, 
and political contact in particular. On the other hand, we use outcome (b) to assess the impact of 
enhanced political contact on levels of participation. In both cases, we seek to offer increased 
clarity about the link between politicians input and civic outcomes.  Existing research in political 
science as well as marketing suggests that a range of different factors may influence these 
outcomes. In particular, we expect that the quality of an MPs response to constituency 
communications, the time taken to respond, and citizens pre-existing anti-political sentiments 
may affect their evaluations of political contact.  
a) Quality of response 
A number of studies have suggested that citizens views of political contact can be 
affected by the nature of the response they receive from a representative. As Livingstone (2004) 
shows, citizens are not always guaranteed a consistent response to the communications that they 
send to politicians. One interviewee in Livingstones (2004: 7) study neatly captures this dilemma: 
You can email [the MP]. But is he going to listen? Vaccaris (2014) study of politicians in 
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom also indicates that 
representatives often fail to respond to their emails. It is clear, then, that politicians responses to 
citizens communications are not necessarily uniform or even commonplace.  
 
Whilst recognising the potential for variation in politicians attitudes to communication, 
more recent research about online political content has shown that personalisation and 
interactivity can improve citizens feelings of connectedness with politicians and politics 
(Kruikemeier et al., 2013). Unlike the classical use of personalisation in campaign literature as 
referring to a focus on individual politicians, we take personalisation to denote a specific 
communication practice. Personalisation here refers to politicians interacting with particular 
aspects of a citizens communication to provide a bespoke response, thus facilitating a direct and 
personal link closely resembling interpersonal communication (Fortin and Dholakia, 2005). In 
essence, when people feel they are engaged in a personalised way, it evokes a sense of 
connectedness similar to personal two-way communication exchanges.  In light of these insights, 
we expect that the nature and content of an MPs response to citizens communications will 
matter for the latters democratic attitudes and actions. In particular, we hypothesise: 
 
H1: More bespoke and detailed responses will result in heightened citizen satisfaction and 
engagement.  
 
b) Role of time 
Second, we focus on the temporality of political contact and specifically the amount of time 
that a politician takes to respond to citizens communication. Extensive research in marketing 
has found that lower waiting times are a strong determinant of overall satisfaction with services 
and customer loyalty (Pruyn and Smidts, 1993; Taylor, 1994, 1995; Hui and Tse, 1996). 
Exporting these insights to politics, we note that time spent waiting is a prevalent and often 
inevitable part of communicating with representatives. With responsibilities to balance across 
Parliament, constituency, and party, along with the volume of correspondence MPs receive, 
citizens can wait a relatively long time for a considered (or even perfunctory) response. Given 
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the importance of listening to representation (Dobson, 2014), we argue that delayed responses 
are likely to fuel unfavourable views. We therefore hypothesise: 
 
H2: The longer a citizen waits for an MP to reply, the less satisfied and likely to engage in 
political contact they will be. 
 
c) General anti-politics sentiment 
Finally, we engage with existing scholarship on anti-politics, which we define as the 
increasing apathy citizens feel towards politics, resulting in what Corbett (2015) terms as 
corrosive cynicism. The anti-politics sentiment has been identified as an important 
contemporary phenomenon across parts of Europe, North America, Australasia and elsewhere 
(for examples see Boswell and Corbett, 2015, McDowell et al., 2014, Saunders, 2014). An IPSOS 
Mori survey of 25 countries published in 2018 indicates that 63 per cent of people believe that 
politicians do not care for the average person, whilst 59 per cent feel that their traditional parties 
and representatives do not care about them. 1 Studies of public attitudes towards politicians in 
the UK have also evidenced a vernacular of vitriolic distaste and distrust (Allen and Birch, 2015a; 
Clarke et al., 2018; Corbett, 2015; Stoker et al., 2016), with a growing body of research 
demonstrating that those displaying anti-political traits and disaffection are more likely to report 
negative views about politics and lower levels of engagement (Allen and Birch, 2015b). Therefore, 
whilst we believe that politicians can tailor their political contact with citizens to improve 
democratic satisfaction and engagement, we also believe that these effects will be mitigated by 
strong anti-politics sentiments. We hypothesise: 
 
H3: Strong anti-political sentiments about politicians will reduce the positive effects of tailored 
political contact on citizens satisfaction and anticipated future engagement. 
 
III. Methods 
 
(a) Research Design 
 
To test these hypotheses, we conducted an EVM study of political contact in the UK. 
Understanding causal relationships  such as those underpinning our hypotheses  requires the 
use of quasi-experimental or experimental designs that afford more control over the inclusion or 
exclusion of confounding factors than traditional observational data (Grant and Wall, 2009; 
Spector, 1981). EVM is particularly well tested as one such approach that both enhances 
experimental realism and maintains strong internal and external validity (Atzmüller and Steiner, 
2010; Hox et al., 1991; Ludwick and Zeller, 2001). In this study, we use a paper people EVM 
design (Aguinis and Bradley, 2014) in which participants were presented with written vignettes 
that described a hypothetical experience of political contact with their local MP. After reading 
the vignette, participants were asked to respond on two measures: their satisfaction with the 
interaction and their likelihood of re-contacting the MP following this interaction.  
 
An EVM study allows for the controlled manipulation of relevant variables whilst retaining 
contextual realism. Given that experiences of political contact are extremely difficult to research 
in real time, the use of EVM allowed us to manipulate the time it took for the MP to respond, 
and the style of that response. We also check the effects of these manipulations across multiple 
                                                            
1 Countries surveyed included Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, 
India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Russia, Spain, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, 
Turkey, and the United States. In total 17, 203 interviews were conducted between June 26  July 9 2018 among 
adults aged 18-64 in the US and Canada, and adults aged 16-64 in all other countries. 
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EVMs in which the medium of political contact is varied. In turn, we could then trace the causal 
effects of these independent variables on our outcome measures (above). Informed by a pilot 
study conducted with a diverse UK sample of 270 participants via the online platform Prolific 
Academic (a quality-controlled survey platform of 45,000+ participants), we designed four 
experiments based on four broadly equally rated and salient public concerns (plastic pollution, 
homelessness, train fares, and NHS waiting times; Figure 1, below). Although participants were 
slightly less worried about rising train fares (Mean = 5.8, SD = 2.6) than the other substantive 
issues, these differences did not manifest in noticeable differences within subsequent analyses of 
the effects of the treatments in the pilot sample [pilot data available upon request]. As such, all 
four issues were retained as substantive hooks for our treatments in the main study.  
 
>>> INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE <<< 
 
Each substantive topic (above) was randomly matched a priori with one predefined medium of 
political contact (by letter, email, social media, and face-to-face) and therefore standardised for all 
participants. However, the order in which participants engaged with each topic (and associated 
medium of political contact) was randomised. This was done purposefully to mitigate against 
order effects in our data and, specifically, counterbalance learning effects as well. Following best 
practice for paper people EVM studies (see, for example, Raaijmakers et al., 2015), each 
experiment was prefaced by a short contextual description of the substantive issue underpinning 
the subsequent hypothetical interaction between participant and MP. For example: 
 
Plastic is a man-made material that we all depend upon. However, less than a fifth of all plastic 
gets recycled globally and this waste is having a devastating impact on the planet. Each year, one 
million sea birds and 100,000 marine mammals are killed from plastic waste in our oceans.   
 
You write a letter to your local Member of Parliament about the issue of plastic waste to express 
your opinions.     
 
Within each experiment, we manipulated the time taken for the MP to respond to the participant 
(1-2 days, 2 weeks, 1 month) and the style of that response (automated, personalised, or an 
invitation for further discussions). These independent variables were specifically selected to 
represent realistic variations in our chosen manipulations. This produced four three-by-three 
experiments with a between-subjects design within each substantive experiment and a within-
subjects design across all four. This mixed design was used to avoid the pitfalls of between-
person-only designs in which participants responses may not accurately reflect true judgements 
of a scenario without additional vignettes as reference points (Aguinis and Bradley, 2014; 
Atzmüller and Steiner, 2010). After reading each introductory description, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of nine treatment conditions and asked to respond to two standard 
questions about each experience: How satisfied are you about this interaction with your MP? (0-10, where 10 = 
Extremely Satisfied); How likely would you be to contact your MP again after this interaction? (Very Unlikely  Very 
Likely). Examples of the nine treatment conditions can be seen in Table 1. It should be noted that 
we purposefully did not include the party affiliation of hypothetical representatives in each EVM. 
As per above, this decision was made in order to isolate voter preferences for political contact 
(on the Left and Right) without the confounding influence of an MPs partisanship (and by 
implication, the connotations these labels carry for partisans and non-partisans alike). 
 
>>> INSERT TABLE 1 HERE <<< 
 
(b) Data Collection 
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We conducted our EVM study of political contact and democratic engagement in March 
2019. Our survey was fielded electronically by Qualtrics, a professional polling company with a 
large global panel population. The survey was initially soft launched to ensure treatment validity 
post-pilot, and participants were filtered out of the sample population based on quality control 
checks such as attention filters and completion times. In total, a nationally diverse sample of 
1500 members of the British public satisfactorily completed our EVM survey.2  
 
 The survey comprised three sections. Firstly, participants worked their way through the 
four EVM experiments. In each case, they read a brief introductory description of a salient 
substantive topic on which they [hypothetically] had contacted their local MP. They were then 
randomly assigned to one of nine treatment topics for each experiment and asked to respond to 
two outcome variables in each case (see above). The number of participants responding to any 
one treatment in each EVM experiment was no less than 164 and no more than 168, thus 
ensuring equality of coverage across our manipulations. At the end of the four EVM 
experiments, participants were asked to reflect on the factors that had influenced their responses 
to each EVM scenario they experienced. This open text question was used as an additional 
robustness check for the saliency of our treatments.  
 
>>> INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE <<< 
 
Looking at this open text data, overall frequencies of terms show that participants most 
commonly referenced the term response (Figure 2, above). To check the contextual meaning of 
these frequent terms, we ran a key word in context (KWIC) search using the Quanteda package 
in R, which supports searching for individual words within a given distance from one another in 
a text. The results support the initial observation that both the timeliness and character of 
political contact mentioned by respondents were influential in affecting their answers. For 
example: 
 
Participant No. 29: If the response was personal and invited me to discuss or meet with the MP I 
was very satisfied.  If the response was automated or a standard response, then I feel as if I was 
being fobbed off and my opinions not listened to. 
 
Participant No. 201: How long I had to wait for a response, whether they addressed me by name 
and if they asked me to go into further detail and pursue the issue. 
 
Participants were then asked to complete two batteries of attitudinal questions taken 
from the British Election Study panel survey: this included six statements about politicians 
designed to elicit participants prior opinions on their elected representatives, and six statements 
testing participants political knowledge. Spearman rank correlations between the least/most 
responsive treatment conditions in each EVM and participants anti-politics scores are 
extremely weak and non-significant, suggesting that the latter were not prejudiced by participants 
exposure to particular treatments. In the final section of the survey, participants were asked basic 
demographic and socioeconomic questions, as well as items measuring their political ideologies 
and voting intentions. Participants were also asked to report how likely they would be to contact 
their local MP using one of the four mediums employed in our EVM experiments (0-10, where 
10 = Extremely Likely). Responses showed that email remains the contact medium of choice 
                                                            
2 In the 1500 respondents, 48.7% were male; 31% were aged 18-35 and 51% were aged over 45; 14% of participants 
self-identified as BAME; 5% had no formal qualifications, 21% reported having A-Levels or Scottish Highers, and 
19% reported completing a Bachelors degree in Higher Education. Participants were also varied by professional 
occupation (e.g. 15% worked in business, finance or law, 19% worked in public sector occupations like education, 
health care and the civil service, and 17% were unemployed). All participants provided prior consent in accordance 
with ethics approval from the University of Sheffield (Ethics Reference 024774). 
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(Mean = 8.0, SD = 2.1), whilst letters (Mean = 4.6, SD = 3.1) and face-to-face communications 
(Mean = 5.1, SD = 3.2) were less popular. Despite a growing research base on the importance of 
social media for political participation, participants in our study also remained significantly less 
likely to use it as a way of contacting their local MP (Mean = 5.7, SD = 3.0). 
 
IV. Analysis 
 
In this study, we set out to assess the impact of political contact upon indicators of 
democratic health, specifically citizen satisfaction and re-engagement with MPs. Our EVM 
manipulated the time and quality of responses to MPs communications with citizens.3 Mean 
scores and standard deviations for our nine treatment conditions are reported in Table 2. These 
data reveal initial observations that support hypotheses 1 and 2. For example, personalised and 
engaged responses from MPs result in substantially higher rates of self-reported satisfaction 
among participants and higher likelihoods of re-contacting an MP. This result holds across all 
vignettes regardless of topic or medium. Within categories of response quality, response time 
also seems to have an effect. Where participants received a response from their MP in 1-2 days 
or within 2 weeks, they were universally more satisfied with that experience than where they 
received a response after 1 month. These effects do not, however, appear to be as large as those 
exerted by response quality. Participants appear to be more satisfied with their experience of 
political contact, and more likely to re-engage, in the final face-to-face vignette. Although the 
inter-treatment effects outlined above still hold in this vignette, these results may say something 
about the unique experience of meeting an MP in person. It is, however, impossible  and not 
the focus of this study - to disentangle this potentially confounding effect from the topic of that 
vignette (NHS waiting times).  
 
>>> INSERT TABLE 2 HERE <<< 
 
 As clarified in the previous section, we set out to establish if political contact could be 
used to improve indicators of democratic health. It is possible that the results we report may be 
affected by the corresponding ideology and/or partisanship of both citizen and MP. Whilst the 
mitigating impact of these two-way effects should form the basis of future research, we now test 
for variations in our dependent variables according to participant ideology before proceeding. To 
assess whether our treatments affect citizens of opposing ideologies differently, we report a 
series of two-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs). In each instance, two-way ANOVAs are used 
to assess the mean differences between participants by ideology (Left or Right) and treatment 
condition (1 month/automated or 2 days/engaged). Participants were asked to report their 
ideology on two ten-point Left-Right scales for economic and social issues. An aggregate score 
was calculated for each participant and then a binary variable was created for those scoring above 
and below the scale midpoint of 5 (Mean = 4.96, SD = 2.04, range = 10). Assuming that any 
differences between participants by ideology will be most pronounced in the least and most 
responsive treatment conditions, we focus on that subsample of participants who were randomly 
allocated to these treatments respectively for each EVM.  
 
>>> INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE <<< 
 
The results of these two-way ANOVAs are reported graphically in Figure 3. In each 
instance, the main effects of our treatment conditions are highly statistically significant, but 
neither the main effects of ideology nor the interaction effects between ideology and our 
                                                            
3 It should be noted that our experiment presumed an equivalence between responses from MPs and from staff in 
MPs offices. We did not test or seek to examine citizens awareness of the possibility of a response not being from 
an MP themselves, although this could be usefully examined in future research.   
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treatment conditions reach statistical significance. The only exception is a relatively weak 
interaction effect on participant satisfaction in the NHS/In Person EVM (F(1, 216) = 4.512, P 
< .05). This suggests that it made a difference to be both on the Left ideologically and assigned 
to the least responsive treatment condition. Subject to future research, it is possible that highly 
politicised subject domains such as the NHS traditionally a policy arena dominated by political 
parties on the Left  can aggravate or ameliorate the effects of tailored political contact. 
However, the majority of results reported here indicate that the impact of political contact (as 
varied by the timeliness and style of an MPs communications) on our chosen indicators of 
democratic health is overwhelmingly comparable for citizens on the Left and Right of politics.4      
  
We now test hypotheses 1 and 2 using a series of OLS regressions that measure the 
effect of our EVM treatments (response time and response style) upon both of our dependent 
variables: participants satisfaction with their hypothetical experience of political contact and 
their likelihood of re-contacting their MP as a result of that contact. The results of these OLS 
models are presented in tables 3 and 4. In each case, the unstandardized regression coefficients 
are shown for eight of our treatment conditions with the ninth (an automated response after 1 
month) as the reference category. This was selected on the basis that it should represent the least 
responsive mode of political contact in terms of our key variables of interest: time and style. 
Controls were also included in these regressions for gender (1 = Male), age (rescaled 0-1 across 
six categories), region (reference category = England), and political knowledge (measured as a 
composite score from responses to six true/false statements about British politics, rescaled 0-1). 
 
>>> INSERT TABLE 3 HERE <<< 
 
 Table 3 shows the results for participants satisfaction with their experience of political 
contact in each EVM experiment. The results demonstrate strong effects across the majority of 
our treatment conditions. In particular, it appears that response style had a greater impact on 
participant satisfaction than response time. For example, personalised or engaged responses 
caused a four to five-point increase in satisfaction across an 11-point scale regardless of the time 
it took for the MP to respond (H1). By contrast, automated responses that were received in less 
than a month only caused a marginal improvement of less than one point in participant 
satisfaction (H2). Given the volume of communications fielded by MPs offices, this may be a 
positive finding. It suggests that MPs can boost their constituency image by improving the 
content of their responses, even if they are unable to respond immediately. The adjusted R2 
scores in table 3 are also indicative. Three of these models (plastic waste by letter; homelessness 
by email; and train fares by social media) are accounting for more than a third of the variance in 
participant satisfaction. This is an impressive result for an EVM study targeting specific variables. 
However, the variance explained by the fourth model, in which political contact occurred face-
to-face, is much lower (just 8%). The increases in satisfaction across the treatment conditions are 
also much more modest (1-2 points).  
 
>>> INSERT TABLE 4 HERE <<< 
 
 
 Table 4 presents the results for our second dependent variable of interest: participants 
likelihood of re-contacting their MP. Unlike participant satisfaction, the coefficients in table 4 
illustrate a more muted story. The effects of our treatment conditions are still highly significant 
and response style still appears to have a greater impact than response time. However, the 
increase in the likelihood of a participant re-contacting their MP following any of our 
                                                            
4 The full results of these tests are available upon request. 
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manipulations is, at best, one point on a five-point scale by comparison to our reference 
treatment. This implies MPs may be able to increase the likelihood that constituents feel willing 
to contact them by improving the content of their communications (H1), but the returns will not 
be as great as the immediate impact on citizen satisfaction seen in table 3. The variance explained 
by these models is also considerably lower than those testing participant satisfaction, suggesting 
that there may be any number of additional confounding variables that counter or reinforce the 
positive effects of tailored political contact when it comes to action-oriented outcomes. Age, 
gender and political knowledge also exert moderate and statistically significant effects upon this 
dependent variable across most of our EVMs. It appears men and older citizens are less likely to 
re-contact their MP, whilst those with high levels of knowledge about politics are more likely to 
do so. 
 
We also hypothesised (H3) that the impact of tailored political contact would be weaker 
where it came up against significant political apathy and generalised anti-political sentiments 
about politicians. To test this, we re-ran our analyses to include interaction terms between each 
of our treatment conditions and participants exogenous attitudes towards politicians. These 
attitudes were measured using six statements that participants were asked to rate on a 5-point 
Likert scale running from strongly disagree to strongly agree (Appendix A). Participant 
responses were then aggregated into a single score on a ten-point scale (0-10, where 10 = most 
anti-political) and rescaled 0-1. Figure 4 illustrates a selection of marginal effects for statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) interaction effects between our experimental manipulations and anti-
political sentiment upon our satisfaction dependent variable. In each plot, the intercept 
represents the main effect of the selected treatment on the dependent variable, and the 
regression line shows the additional effects within that treatment condition across our anti-
politics scale. Confidence levels and underlying distributions of the anti-politics scale have been 
included for reference. Contra to our hypothesis, we find that MPs can counteract negative 
public sentiments by improving the style of their constituent communications. Put another way, 
participants with the strongest negative attitudes towards politicians were an additional 2-3 
points more satisfied with their MPs contact (when the style of that communication was 
bespoke) than participants who already had more positive opinions about politicians. 
 
>>> INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE <<< 
 
We then re-ran these interaction models for our second dependent variable: participants 
likelihood of re-contacting their MP. The trends in the results ran in the opposite direction to 
those presented above; only two of these interactions were statistically significant (Figure 5). It 
appears that far from mitigating the effects of anti-politics, the positive impact of our EVM 
treatments on the outcome variable were reversed when interacted with participants attitudes 
towards politicians. For example, participants with the most negative opinions of politicians were 
equally likely (or unlikely) to re-contact their MP regardless of whether they had received quick, 
moderate or slow responses in the hypothetical EVM, or whether those responses were 
automated, personalised or engaged. This suggests, contrary to other studies, that there are 
conditions under which those with anti-political sentiments will engage. 
 
>>> INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE <<< 
 
V. Discussion 
 
In conducting this study, we were interested in exploring the extent to which 
representatives could tailor their political contact with the public to affect citizens satisfaction 
and anticipated future engagement. Specifically, we explored whether variations in the content 
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and timeliness of MPs responses to citizens communications across varying media precipitated 
differences in these outcome variables. We find: 
 
(a) Personalised responses can significantly improve citizens satisfaction with political 
communication and moderately improve the likelihood of reengagement (H1 supported); 
(b) Quick responses to communication can marginally improve citizens satisfaction and 
rates of anticipated political contact (H2 partially supported); 
(c) Politicians can overturn pre-existing anti-political sentiments by personalising their public 
communications, insofar as they can catalyse higher levels of positive satisfaction with 
political contact among those who are most disenchanted (H3 unsupported). 
 
Our findings offer evidence that the style of political contact does matter for measures of 
democratic health. The results are not, however, always as we expected. With regard to H1, we 
predicted that more bespoke and detailed responses would cultivate greater citizen satisfaction 
and political engagement. In line with our expectations, we find that personalised or engaged 
responses from MPs  that either addressed the participant by name, responded in detail to 
specific questions, or invited the participant for further discussions about a policy issue  caused 
a substantial increase in participant satisfaction (as well as moderate increases in the likelihood of 
reengaging). These results hold regardless of the time it took for the MP to respond. Some of 
our participants open-text reflections point to the importance of this human connection:  
 
Participant No. 796: I knew I could contact the MP again when they replied so personally as they 
also were concerned about the issues. However, if the MP had sent an automated reply to me, 
that meant they didnt care. 
 
Participant No. 936: Personal acknowledgement shows that the MP has taken on board my views 
and so it is worth my while persevering with the matter.   
 
By contrast, we only find marginal support for our second hypothesis, in which we predicted that 
the longer a citizen has to wait for an MP to respond to them, the less satisfied and likely to 
engage in politics they will be (H2). Contrary to our expectation, we find that it made very little 
positive difference whether an MP responded to a participant within one to two days or one 
month.  
 
 These results demonstrate the importance of quality as opposed to speed when it comes 
to effective political contact between governor and governed. Possibly more striking is the 
unexpected interaction uncovered here between the quality of political contact (as measured by 
content and timeliness) and anti-political sentiment. The results of our experiments suggest that 
even those who are currently most disengaged with politics, and express the most negative 
opinions about politicians, can exhibit positive changes in relation to our indicators of 
democratic health following political contact with their representatives (H3). A review of open-
text reflections from participants with above-average scores for anti-political attitudes suggests 
two nascent themes: a sensitivity to the authenticity of an MP and a desire to be heard or given 
credence. These inferences are captured by the comments of such cynically minded participants: 
 
Participant No. 191: The personal and engaged responses made me feel my MP was taking me 
and their role seriously. 
 
Participant No. 307: If your local MP actually acknowledges you and doesnt just use auto-
generated responses, you are much more likely to be satisfied that they are actually listening to 
you. 
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These findings are not only pertinent for scholars of political contact and anti-politics, but they 
also offer important insights for political representatives themselves. Future studies should seek 
to replicate these results and interrogate the psychological foundations of our qualitative 
suppositions. 
 
 These findings are likely to be of interest to political representatives as they suggest it is 
possible to make small adjustments to current communication practices that may result in 
positive constituent outcomes as well as enhanced civic engagement. However, in drawing this 
conclusion, we argue that some caution is needed. The relationship between political satisfaction 
and the form of contact is likely to be affected by additional variables that we have not 
considered here. Existing research on partisanship effects suggests that the congruence between 
an MPs partisan position and voters own ideology may affect judgements. It is possible, for 
example, that ideological bias might mean that (a) citizens are more/less likely to contact an MP 
of a similar/different partisan or ideological persuasion in the first place, and (b) their judgement 
on the quality of that experience may be distorted accordingly (in either a positive or negative 
direction). Similarly, it may be that the outcome of any interaction between governor and 
governed, and the degree to which citizens feel that their issues and views have been resolved 
and acted upon, may also have a strong retroactive impact. Put another way, citizens might be 
satisfied with an MPs initial response, but may be equally or more disappointed if that MPs 
efforts do not produce a positive outcome. In addition, perceptions may vary dependent on 
whether it is an MP themselves that responds to citizen contact, or a member of an MPs staff. 
Our study has not disaggregated this possibility, but Crewes (2015) work has shown that MPs 
working styles vary from highly to minimally involved, hence variations in practice may exist that 
could affect citizens views. These possibilities suggest that, in practice, it may be difficult for 
MPs to achieve the results we have highlighted in this experimental survey, raising additional 
lines of inquiry for future research. 
  
Insofar as these results are generalisable to other states where anti-politics is prominent, 
we believe that these findings will be of special interest to scholars of comparative majoritarian 
political systems in the Anglosphere (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the US). With similar 
norms of political contact derived from the Westminster model, these practices may be 
generalisable to representatives and practitioners. At the same time, further analysis is required to 
explore the extent to which these findings are replicated in other democratic contexts, and in 
particular in systems which operate under different representative systems (I.e. proportional or 
multi-member constituency electoral systems). 
 
Our findings are equally important in the context of a wider scholarship on political 
practice that has emphasised the constraints on representatives ability to act as citizens may 
desire. Clarke et al. (2018)s book The Good Politician, for example, has demonstrated how the 
dynamics of contemporary politics shape the way that politicians can behave  resulting, at 
present, in shorter and often poorer, less authentic performances by politicians. Even if the 
results that we have produced hold up to further analysis and scrutiny, it is important to note 
that MPs may not be in a position to respond. As Flinders et al. (2018) have noted, politicians 
face extreme workloads and confront a range of stresses in navigating the vocation of politics. It 
may, therefore, not be feasible to expect politicians to respond in great detail and with invitations 
for further engagement. In this light, we note Parliaments recent calls for the parliamentary 
digital service to identify tools to help increase the volume and quality of interaction between 
MPs and their constituents' (UK Parliament, 2015: 10). Mirroring this call, we suggest it would 
also be fruitful for institutions to consider how they can support representatives in meeting 
citizens desires for the form of response. This could be done by creating a code of best practice 
for MP communication, led by political parties or Parliamentary bodies such as the Independent 
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Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA), that established clear benchmarks and realistic 
expectations of the form political contact should take. 
 
 Though not a primary focus of this article, we also explored the effects of political 
contact across different media. Here we build on analyses by Bimber (1999), Dalhberg (2001) 
and Stromer-Galley et al., (2015), who have all demonstrated that the channels of interaction and 
the different affordances of tools can impact upon civic engagement. By contrast, we find very 
little variation across remote forms of media (email, letter, and social media), with aggregate 
levels of satisfaction and anticipated engagement no different across these media regardless of 
our treatment conditions. As a result, we suggest that representatives may be better placed to 
focus their energies on the content of their public communications rather than expending too 
much time mastering any one medium. We do find, however, that increases in the quality of 
political contact (content and timeliness) have significantly lower positive effects when that 
contact occurs face-to-face. We intuit this may say something specific about the experience of 
meeting an MP in person, particularly the heightened expectations and connectedness that may 
occur as a result. This supplements previous research that shows face-to-face interactions, as 
opposed to online communication methods, can yield bolder and more sustained political 
discussions and deliberations (Stromer-Galley et al., 2015). Unlike other forms of detached 
communication, citizens may expect their MPs to take more immediate action following direct 
political contact. This is likely because the experience of being listened to in person raises 
expectations of subsequent action, making it harder for politicians to exceed expectations and 
hence induce higher levels of satisfaction. Gender, age, and political knowledge also exerted 
small but statistically significant effects in the face-to-face EVMs, suggesting that older men and 
those with low levels of knowledge about politics may be less satisfied with their MPs response 
following face-to-face contact irrespective of how quick or bespoke that response.  
 
In conducting this research, we argue that these findings mark an important advance in 
our understanding of the dynamics of political contact and representation. They also help to 
demonstrate the value of the experimental method for studies of this type. EVM allows scholars 
to explore the impact of different response types on different dependent variables, building up a 
rich picture of the influences upon and outcomes of different forms of political contact. For 
scholars of representation this approach could be applied to studies of representative style 
(trustee, delegate, partisan, for example), or to examine responses to different governing 
outcomes. Common in other disciplines, we therefore argue that experiments have the potential 
to offer valuable insights for scholars of political science. And yet, we also need to acknowledge 
the limitations that future research into this topic may want to consider. EVM forces participants 
to respond to hypothetical scenarios that cannot necessarily replicate the same contextual 
experience encountered in real life (e.g. Lohrke et al., 2010). This is particularly challenging 
when it comes to studying political contact, given the difficulty of reproducing the contextual 
details and decision-making pressures of a scenario that is relatively rare, unfamiliar to most 
members of public, and often bespoke where it does occur (especially when contact occurs face-
to-face). In relation to H3, for example, it is possible that citizens with strong anti-political 
sentiments might be highly unlikely to engage in the type of citizen-initiated contact with MPs 
we outline in our EVMs. We cannot say with certainty, therefore, that results we report here 
would replicate in natural settings. To improve the external validity of our results, we recognise 
that future iterations of this study should seek to enhance the level of realism and improve 
participant immersion in the EVM by using audio, pictures, video or interactive technologies (see 
also Hughes and Huby, 2002). There is also a case for refining the sample to include only 
participants who have already contacted an MP in real life. By studying people who are familiar 
with a situation, researchers using experimental methodologies are less likely to elicit artificial 
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results (e.g. Aiman-Smith et al., 2002), although this would, by implication, limit the 
generalisability of the findings.  
 
In conclusion, we argue that this article marks an important development in our 
understanding of the micro-level aspects of political contact. Offering new insights into citizens 
reactions to different forms of political contact, we have sought to develop our understanding of 
the dynamics of representation. In particular, we argue that these insights have practical 
implications for our understanding of representation, highlighting the importance of the form of 
political contact for citizen views. Additionally, our findings provide valuable evidence that 
politicians seeking to promote citizen satisfaction and engagement may want to (and need 
support to) pay attention to the quality of their responses to contact  making personalised 
responses, even if this takes additional time. Quality, not speed, is what citizens appear to want.  
 
 
 
 
 
Author Accepted Manuscript 
 16 
References 
Aguinis, H and Bradley, KJ (2014). Best practice recommendations for designing and 
implementing experimental vignette methodology studies. Organisational Research Methods 17(4): 
351-371. 
Aiman-Smith, L, and Scullen, SE, and Barr, SH (2002) Conducting studies of decision-making in 
organisational contexts: A tutorial of policy-capturing and other regression-based techniques, 
Organizational Research Methods 5(4): 388-414.  
Allen, N and Birch, S (2015a). Process preferences and British public opinion: Citizens 
judgements about government in an era of anti-politics. Political Studies Vol. 63: 390411. 
Allen, N and Birch, S (2015b) Ethics and Integrity in British Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Atzmüller, C, & Steiner, PM (2010). Experimental vignette studies in survey research. Methodology: 
European Journal of Research Methods for the Behavioural and Social Sciences 6: 128-138. 
Auel, K and Umit, R (2018) Explaining MPs communication to their constituents: Evidence 
from the UK House of Commons. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20(3): 731-
752. 
Bengtsson, Ꮋ and Wass. H (2010) Styles of political representation: What do voters expect?, 
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 20(1): 55-81. 
Bimber, B (1999) The internet and citizen communication with government: Does the medium 
matter?. Political Communication 16(4): 409-428. 
Boswell, J and Corbett, J (2015) Stoic Democrats? Anti-politics, elite cynicism and the policy 
process. Journal of European Public Policy 22(10): 1388-1405.  
Cain, BE, Ferejohn, JA and Fiorina, M (1987) The Personal Vote. Harvard University Press. 
Caramani, D (2017) Will vs. reason: The populist and technocratic forms of political 
representation and their critique to party government. American Political Science Review 111(1): 54-
67. 
Centeno MA (1993) The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy. Theory and 
Society 22(3): 307-335. 
Clarke, N and Stoker, G, Jennings, W and Moss, J (2018) The Good Politician: Political Interaction, 
and the Rise of Anti-Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Corbett, J (2015) Diagnosing the problem of anti-politicians: A review and an agenda. Political 
Science Review 14(4): 534-543.  
Crewe, E (2015) The House of Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work. Bloomsbury Academic. 
Dahl, R (1971) Polyarchy: participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Dahlberg, L (2001) The internet and democratic discourse: Exploring the prospects of online 
deliberative forums extending the public sphere. Information, Communication and Society 4(4): 615-
633.  
Dalton, R (2004) Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Author Accepted Manuscript 
 17 
Davis, R (2009) Typing Politics: The Role of Blogs in American Politics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Dobson, A (2014) Listening for Democracy: Recognition, representation, reconciliation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Fenno, RF (1978). Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Boston: Little Brown. 
Flinders, M (2012) Defending Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Flinders, M, Weinberg, A, Weinberg, A, Geddes, M, and Kwiatkowski, R (2018), Governing 
under pressure? The mental wellbeing of politicians. Parliamentary Affairs. Epub ahead of print 28 
December 2019. DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsy046. 
Flynn, P (2012) How to Be An MP: Biteback Publishing. 
Fortin, DR, & Dholakia, RR (2005). Interactivity and vividness effects on social presence and 
involvement with a web-based advertisement. Journal of Business Research, 58(3): 387-396. 
Gandy, R (2018) Increasing Localism in Elected Politicians? Political Insight, 9(3): 22-25. 
Gay, O (2005) MPs Go Back to Their Constituencies The Political Quarterly, 76(1): 57-66. 
Grant, AM and Wall, TD (2009). The neglected science and art of quasi-experimentation: Why-
to, when-to, and how-to advice for organizational researchers. Organisational Research Methods 
12(4): 653-686. 
Grayling, AC (2017) Democracy and Its Crisis, London: OneWorld Publications.  
Gibson, R. K., Margolis, M, Resnick, D and Ward, SJ (2003) Election campaigning on the WWW 
in the USA and UK: A comparative analysis. Party Politics 9(1): 47-75.  
Hansard Society (2015) The First 100 Days: A Survival Guide for New MPs, 27 May 2015. 
Available at: www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blog/the-first-100-days-a-survival-guide-for-new-mps 
(accessed 10 August 2019). 
Hajer, MA (2009) Authoritative Governance: Policy-making in the age of mediatisation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hay, C (2007) Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity.  
Hofstetter, E and Stokoe, E (2015). Offers of assistance in politicianconstituent interaction. 
Discourse Studies 17(6): 724-751. 
Hox, JJ, Kreft, IG and Hermkens, PL (1991). The analysis of factorial surveys. Sociological Methods 
and Research 19(4): 493-510. 
Kreft, IG, and Hermkens, PL (1991). The analysis of factorial surveys. Sociological Methods & 
Research 19: 493-510.  
Hui, MK and Tse, DK (1996) What to tell consumers in waits of different lengths: An integrative 
model of service evaluation. Journal of Marketing 60(2): 81-90.  
Hughes, R and Huby, M (2002) The application of vignettes in social and nursing research. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 37(4): 382-386.  
Author Accepted Manuscript 
 18 
IPSOS Mori (2018) 'Anti-system' sentiment is still strong around the world. Available at: 
www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/anti-system-sentiment-still-strong-around-world (accessed on 
31 August 2019) 
Jackson, N (2003) MPs and web technologies: An untapped opportunity?. Journal of Public Affairs 
3(2): 124-137. 
Jackson, N and Lilleker, D (2011) Microblogging, constituency service and impression 
management: UK MPs and use of Twitter. The Journal of Legislative Studies 17(1): 86-105. 
Jewell, ME (1983) Legislator-constituency relations and the representative process. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 8(3): 303-337. 
Joshi, D and Rosenfield, E (2013) MP transparency, communication links and social media: A 
comparative assessment of parliamentary websites. Journal of Legislative Studies. 19(4): 526-545. 
King, A (1974) British Members of Parliament: A Self-Portrait: Granada Television Ltd.  
Kölln, A (2015) The value of political parties to representative democracy. European Political 
Science Review 7(4): 593-613.  
Kriess, D (2016) Prototype Politics: Technology Intensive Campaigning and the Data of Democracy. Oxford: 
OUP. 
Kruikemeier, S, van Noort, G, Vliegenthart, R, and de Vreese, CH (2013) Getting closer: The 
effects of personalised and interactive online political communication. European Journal of 
Communication 28(1): 53-66.  
Lander, M (2007) Germans split over a mosque and the role of Islam. New York Times.  July 5, 
2007. 
Lawrence, J (2009), Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics From Hogarth to Blair. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lilleker, DG, Koc-Michalska, K and Schweitzer, EJ (2011) Informing, engaging, mobilising, or 
interacting: Searching for a European model of web campaigning. European Journal of 
Communication 26(3): 195-213.  
Linde, J and Peters, Y (2018) Responsiveness, support, and responsibility: How democratic 
responsiveness facilitates responsible government, Party Politics. Epub ahead of print 29 March 
2018. DOI: 10.1177/1354068818763986. 
Livingstone, S (2004) Media literacy and the challenge of communication technologies. The 
Communication Review 7(1): 3-14.  
Lohrke, FT, Holloway, BB and Woolley, TW (2010) Conjoint analysis in entrepreneurship 
research: A review and agenda. Organisational Research Methods 13(1): 16-30. 
Ludwick, R & Zeller, RA (2001) The factorial survey: An experimental method to replicate real 
world problems. Nursing Research 50(2): 129-133. 
Lusoli, W, Ward, S and Gibson, R (2006) (Re)connecting politics? Parliament, the public and the 
internet. Parliamentary Affairs 59(2): 24-42. 
Müller, JW (2017) What is Populism, London: Penguin.  
Author Accepted Manuscript 
 19 
Mansbridge, J (2003) Rethinking representation. The American Political Science Review 97(4): 515-528.  
McAllister, I (2015) The personalisation of politics in Australia. Party Politics 21(3): 337-345. 
McDowell, L, Rootham, E and Hardgrove, A (2014) Politics, anti-politics, quiescence and radical 
unpolitics: Young mens political participation in an ordinary English town. Journal of Youth 
Studies 17(1): 42-62.  
Norris, P (2011) Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited. Cambridge: CUP. 
Norton, P and Wood, DM (1993) Back from Westminster: British Members of Parliament and Their 
Constituents: The University of Kentucky Press. 
Pitkin, H (1967) The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Pruyn, A and Smidts, A (1998) Effects of waiting on the satisfaction with the service: Beyond 
objective time measures. International Journal of Research in Marketing 15(4): 321-334.  
Radice, L, Vallance, E and Willis, V (1987) Member of Parliament: The Job of a Backbencher: The 
Macmillian Press. 
Rosenstone, SJ & Hansen, JM (1993) Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Runciman, D (2018) How Democracy Ends. London: Profile Books.   
Saunders, C. (2014) Anti-politics in action? Measuring dilemmas in the study of unconventional 
political participation. Political Research Quarterly 67(3): 574-588.  
Seyd, B (2015) Exploring political disappointment. Parliamentary Affairs 69(2): 327-347. 
Spector, PE (1981) Research designs. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Stoker, G, Hay, C and Barr, M (2016) Fast thinking: Implications for democratic politics. 
European Journal of Political Research 55(1): 3-21.  
Stromer-Galley, J, Bryant, L and Bimber, B (2015) Context and medium matter: Expressing 
Disagreements online and face-to-face deliberations. Journal of Public Deliberation 11(1).  
Sundar, SS, Kalyanaraman, S, & Brown, J (2003) Explicating Web site interactivity: Impression 
formation effects in political campaign sites. Journal of Communication 30(1): 30-59. 
Taggart, P (1996) The New Populism and the New Politics: New Protest Parties in Sweden in a Comparative 
Perspective. London: Macmillan. 
Taylor, S (1995) The effects of filled waiting time and service provider control over the delay on 
evaluations of service. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 23(38): 38-48.  
Tromble, R (2016) Thanks for (actually) responding! How citizen demand shapes politicians 
interactive engagement on Twitter. New Media and Society 20(2): 676-697.  
Tedesco, JC (2006) Web interactivity and young adult political efficacy. In: Williams, AP & JC 
Tedesco (Eds.), The Internet election: Perspectives on the Web in campaign 2004. Lanham, MD : Rowman 
and Littlefield, pp. 187-202. 
UK Parliament. (2015) Speakers Commission on Digital Democracy. London: Stationary Office.  
Author Accepted Manuscript 
 20 
Urbinati, N and Warren, ME (2008) The concept of representation in contemporary democratic 
theory. Annual Review of Political Science 11(1): 387-412.  
Vaccari, C (2014) Youve got (no) mail: How parties and candidates respond to e-mail inquiries 
in Western democracies. Journal of Informational Technology and Politics 11(2): 245-258. 
Verba, S, Nie, NH and Kim, J (1978) Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Vivyan, N and Wagner, M (2015) What do Voters Want from their Local MP?. Political Quarterly 
86(1): 33-40.  
Wood, DM and Norton, P (1992) Do candidates matter? Constituency-specific vote changes for 
incumbent MPs 1983-1987. Political Studies 40(2): 227-238.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Accepted Manuscript 
 21 
Figure 1. On a scale of 0-10 (where 10 = extremely important), how much do the following issues matter to you? 
(Pilot data, N = 270, January 2019) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Accepted Manuscript 
 22 
 
Figure 2. Thinking about your answers so far, what influenced your decisions? 
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Figure 3. A series of two-way ANOVAs to assess the effects of ideology and treatment 
conditions upon citizen satisfaction and engagement with political contact. 
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Figure 4. Interaction plots showing the combined effects of response time/response style and 
anti-political sentiment upon citizen satisfaction with political contact (Reference = 1 
month/automated) 
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Figure 5. Interaction plots showing the combined effects of response time/response style and 
anti-political sentiment upon citizens likelihood of re-contacting their local MP after initial 
experience of contact (Reference = 1 month/automated) 
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Table 1. Experimental interaction #1 about plastic waste via letter. Examples of nine different 
treatment conditions varied by response time and response style. 
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O
N
S
E
 
 Quick Moderate Slow 
  
A
u
to
m
at
ed
 
1-2 days later your 
local Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
replies in a letter. 
The response is an 
auto-reply that 
acknowledges your 
letter and tells you 
that your opinions 
and those of other 
constituents are 
very important to 
the MP. 
2 weeks later your 
local Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
replies in a letter. 
The response is an 
auto-reply that 
acknowledges your 
letter and tells you 
that your opinions 
and those of other 
constituents are 
very important to 
the MP. 
Over a month later 
your local Member 
of Parliament (MP) 
replies in a letter. 
The response is an 
auto-reply that 
acknowledges your 
letter and tells you 
that your opinions 
and those of other 
constituents are 
very important to 
the MP. 
  
P
er
so
n
al
is
ed
 
1-2 days later your 
local Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
replies in a letter. 
The response is 
highly 
personalised. The 
MP addresses you 
by name, engages 
with everything 
you said in your 
letter, and 
promises that the 
MP will campaign 
harder to resolve 
the issue of plastic 
waste. 
2 weeks later your 
local Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
replies in a letter. 
The response is 
highly personalised. 
The MP addresses 
you by name, 
engages with 
everything you said 
in your letter, and 
promises that the 
MP will campaign 
harder to resolve 
the issue of plastic 
waste. 
Over a month later 
your local Member 
of Parliament (MP) 
replies in a letter. 
The response is 
highly personalised. 
The MP addresses 
you by name, 
engages with 
everything you said 
in your letter, and 
promises that the 
MP will campaign 
harder to resolve 
the issue of plastic 
waste. 
  
E
n
ga
ge
d
 
1-2 days later your 
local Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
replies in a letter. 
The response 
acknowledges your 
letter and asks for 
more details. The 
MP invites you to 
discuss your letter 
further at their 
constituency 
office. 
2 weeks later your 
local Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
replies in a letter. 
The response 
acknowledges your 
letter and asks for 
more details. The 
MP invites you to 
discuss your letter 
further at their 
constituency office. 
Over a month later 
your local Member 
of Parliament (MP) 
replies in a letter. 
The response 
acknowledges your 
letter and asks for 
more details. The 
MP invites you to 
discuss your letter 
further at their 
constituency office. 
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Table 2. Sample means and standard deviations for citizen satisfaction and likelihood of re-
engagement across nine treatment conditions. 
 
Treatment/Independe
nt Variable 
Plastic/By 
Letter 
Homelessness/
By Email 
Train Fares/By 
Social Media 
NHS/Face-
to-Face 
DV 1  DV 2  
 
DV 1  
 
DV 2  DV 1  DV 2  DV 1  DV 2  
1-2 days/automated 2.92 
(2.64) 
2.94 
(1.41) 
3.02 
(2.7) 
3.27 
(1.48) 
2.66 
(2.53) 
2.89 
(1.43) 
6.56 
(2.63) 
3.93 
(1.05) 
2 weeks/automated 2.66 
(2.41) 
3.15 
(1.45) 
3.25 
(2.9) 
3 
(1.41) 
2.89 
(2.8) 
2.84 
(1.37) 
5.96 
(2.71) 
3.64 
(1.13) 
1 month/automated 3.16 
(2.77) 
3.08 
(1.38) 
2.37 
(2.51) 
2.98 
(1.58) 
2.5 
(2.43) 
2.89 
(1.49) 
5.38 
(2.98) 
3.51 
(1.34) 
1-2 days/personalised 7.4 
(2.33) 
3.91 
(1.14) 
7.33 
(2.38) 
3.9 
(1.08) 
7.11 
(2.49) 
3.77 
(1.18) 
7.97 
(2.32) 
4.11 
(1.05) 
2 weeks/personalised 7.43 
(2.16) 
3.96 
(1.03) 
7.71 
(2.36) 
3.96 
(1.12) 
6.69 
(2.65) 
3.65 
(1.14) 
7.38 
(2.71) 
4.01 
(1.23) 
1 month/personalised 6.95 
(2.6) 
3.76 
(1.25) 
6.78 
(2.39) 
3.79 
(1.09) 
6.59 
(2.82) 
3.71 
(1.17) 
6.77 
(2.78) 
4.02 
(.96) 
1-2 days/engaged 7.03 
(2.38) 
3.82 
(1.12) 
7.22 
(2.29) 
4.02 
(1.1) 
7.35 
(2.46) 
3.99 
(1.11) 
7.94 
(2.17) 
4.26 
(.92) 
2 weeks/engaged 7.13 
(2.35) 
4.05 
(.98) 
7.32 
(2.59) 
3.99 
(1.22) 
6.58 
(2.71) 
3.83 
(1.13) 
6.98 
(2.77) 
4.02 
(1.13) 
1 month/engaged 6.49 
(2.3) 
3.78 
(1.01) 
6.63 
(2.27) 
3.98 
(1.16) 
5.87 
(2.93) 
3.43 
(1.21) 
6.87 
(2.89) 
3.9 
(1.24) 
NOTE:  
DV 1 = How satisfied are you about this interaction with your MP? (0-10, where 10 = Extremely 
Satisfied) 
DV 2 = How likely would you be to contact your MP again after this interaction? (5-point Likert 
Scale: Very Unlikely  Very Likely) 
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Table 3. How satisfied are you about this interaction with your MP? (0-10, where 10 = 
Extremely Satisfied) 
 
 
Dependent variable: satisfaction with contact 
  
 
Plastic/By Letter 
Homelessness/By 
Email 
Train Fares/By 
Social Media 
NHS/Face-to-
Face 
 
(N = 1500) (N = 1498) (N = 1500) (N = 1500) 
 1-2 days/automated -0.230 0.629** 0.186 1.172*** 
 
(0.269) (0.280) (0.292) (0.293) 
     2 weeks/automated -0.474* 0.875*** 0.410 0.528* 
 
(0.270) (0.281) (0.291) (0.293) 
     1-2 days/personalised 4.268*** 4.952*** 4.630*** 2.511*** 
 
(0.270) (0.280) (0.291) (0.293) 
     2 weeks/personalised 4.251*** 5.307*** 4.205*** 1.983*** 
 
(0.269) (0.280) (0.291) (0.292) 
     1 month/personalised 3.794*** 4.419*** 4.093*** 1.340*** 
 
(0.269) (0.279) (0.291) (0.292) 
     1-2 days/invitation 3.872*** 4.820*** 4.877*** 2.549*** 
 
(0.269) (0.279) (0.292) (0.292) 
     2 weeks/invitation 3.971*** 4.941*** 4.092*** 1.613*** 
 
(0.269) (0.280) (0.291) (0.293) 
     1 month/invitation 3.351*** 4.238*** 3.366*** 1.456*** 
 
(0.270) (0.280) (0.291) (0.292) 
     Gender (Male) -0.171 -0.123 0.080 -0.309** 
 
(0.141) (0.147) (0.153) (0.154) 
Northern Ireland -0.519 0.379 0.441 0.318 
 
(0.478) (0.499) (0.517) (0.521) 
Scotland -0.174 -0.217 -0.463* 0.059 
 
(0.236) (0.246) (0.256) (0.257) 
Wales -0.230 -0.393 -0.061 -0.147 
 
(0.262) (0.273) (0.284) (0.286) 
Age -0.274 -0.090 -0.393 -0.613** 
 
(0.236) (0.246) (0.256) (0.258) 
Knowledge 0.210 -0.040 0.066 0.719*** 
 
(0.247) (0.258) (0.268) (0.269) 
     Constant 3.293*** 2.545*** 2.642*** 5.461*** 
 
(0.228) (0.241) (0.252) (0.249) 
      Adjusted R2 0.395 0.391 0.344 0.083 
Residual Std. Error 
2.443            
(df = 1485) 
2.549            
(df = 1483) 
2.653            
(df = 1485) 
2.667            
(df = 1485) 
F Statistic 70.794***              69.584***            57.229***         10.724***            
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(df = 14; 1485) (df = 14; 1483) (df = 14; 1485) (df = 14; 1485) 
 Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 4. How likely would you be to contact your MP again after this interaction? (5-point 
Likert Scale: Very Unlikely  Very Likely) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Likelihood of re-contacting 
  
 
Plastic/By 
Letter 
Homelessness/By 
Email 
Train Fares/By 
Social Media 
NHS/Face-to-
Face 
 
(N = 1500) (N = 1498) (N = 1500) (N = 1500) 
 1-2 days/automated -0.144 0.284** 0.021 0.400*** 
 
(0.133) (0.138) (0.138) (0.123) 
     2 weeks/automated 0.064 0.028 -0.032 0.106 
 
(0.133) (0.138) (0.137) (0.123) 
     1-2 days/personalised 0.838*** 0.923*** 0.899*** 0.566*** 
 
(0.133) (0.137) (0.138) (0.123) 
     2 weeks/personalised 0.858*** 0.979*** 0.772*** 0.489*** 
 
(0.133) (0.138) (0.137) (0.123) 
     1 month/personalised 0.682*** 0.802*** 0.828*** 0.484*** 
 
(0.133) (0.137) (0.137) (0.123) 
     1-2 days/invitation 0.723*** 1.049*** 1.123*** 0.731*** 
 
(0.133) (0.137) (0.138) (0.123) 
     2 weeks/invitation 0.966*** 1.009*** 0.948*** 0.497*** 
 
(0.133) (0.138) (0.138) (0.123) 
     1 month/invitation 0.687*** 1.010*** 0.541*** 0.375*** 
 
(0.133) (0.138) (0.137) (0.123) 
     Gender (Male) -0.171** -0.176** 0.039 -0.170*** 
 
(0.070) (0.072) (0.072) (0.065) 
Northern Ireland -0.214 -0.029 0.133 0.153 
 
(0.236) (0.245) (0.244) (0.219) 
Scotland -0.009 0.146 -0.199* -0.085 
 
(0.117) (0.121) (0.121) (0.108) 
Wales 0.033 0.045 0.103 0.075 
 
(0.129) (0.134) (0.134) (0.120) 
Age -0.057 -0.370*** -0.339*** -0.078 
 
(0.117) (0.121) (0.121) (0.108) 
Knowledge 0.313** 0.241* 0.104 0.347*** 
 
(0.122) (0.127) (0.126) (0.113) 
Constant 3.025*** 3.101*** 2.977*** 3.454*** 
 
(0.113) (0.118) (0.119) (0.105) 
      Adjusted R2 0.097 0.103 0.104 0.036 
Residual Std. Error 
1.207            
(df = 1485) 
1.254            
(df = 1483) 
1.252            
(df = 1485) 
1.121            
(df = 1485) 
F Statistic 12.543***       13.319***                       13.418***           5.007***         
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(df = 14; 1485) (df = 14; 1483) (df = 14; 1485) (df = 14; 1485) 
 Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix A  Descriptive statistics for anti-politics survey battery about politicians. Participants 
responded on a 5-point Likert scale running from strong disagree to strongly agree. Scores have been 
reversed where appropriate to ensure that all responses run in the same direction.  
 
Descriptive statistics/Anti-Politics Items 
 
Statistic N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
 Politicians prioritise some citizens and their interests over 
others. 
1,500 3.8 0.9 1 3 4 5 
Parties and politicians in the UK are more concerned with 
fighting each other than furthering public interest. 
1,500 4.2 0.9 1 4 5 5 
Politicians are extremely busy and often don't have the 
time to do everything. 
1,500 3.0 1.1 1 2 4 5 
Politicians do their best to respond to citizens when they 
are contacted. 
1,500 3.2 1.0 1 3 4 5 
Politicians care what you think. 1,500 3.7 1.0 1 3 4 5 
Your member of parliament tries hard to look after the 
interests of people who live in your constituency. 
1,500 3.1 1.1 1 2 4 5 
 
 
